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FAILURES OF POWER-BALANCING: THE OTTOMANS AND
BRITISH IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT
AMNA ABUDYAK, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF SHARJAH
MENTOR: ISA BLUMI
Abstract
This paper aims to present Ottoman, Arab, and British dynamics in the
Arabian Peninsula. The paper highlights British exploitation of political
circumstances to gain presence in Iraq and the Gulf (more particularly Kuwait)
throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As pan-Arab movements began
to gain traction within Arab territories during the final years of the Ottoman Empire,
Gulf tribes sought to move away from Ottoman influence and to establish greater
sovereignty, control, and border integrity. This desire for Arab tribes to form
independent polities was utilized by the British to competitively gain strategic
presence against France, the Dutch, and Russia in the Arabian Peninsula and the
Middle East on a wider scale for various reasons.
This paper first covers internal conditions within the Ottoman Empire, as
well as Ottoman-Arab relations. Second, utilizing historical texts, the paper
specifies the nature of British–Arab relations to lay the historical contextual
framework for shifting sentiments in the Gulf as the Ottoman Empire weakened.
The paper then moves on to explicate geopolitical factors for continuous border
disputes between Kuwait and its northern neighbor, Iraq, which eventually
culminated in the 1990 Iraqi invasion. Secondary sources are consulted to present
the consequences of British involvement in heightening tensions in Iraq and,
vicariously, Kuwait due to the catalyst effect of their diplomatic missions and
establishment of protectorates parallel to growing pan-Arab sentiment. Finally, the
events discussed are reviewed through power-balancing theory to assess the effects
of political decisions on both Iraq and Kuwait.
Keywords: Pan-Arabism, tribal relations, British diplomacy, Ottoman
Empire, power balancing, Arabian Gulf
In the political climate of the 19th and 20th centuries, the Ottoman Empire
found itself a waning empire surrounded by European powers who intended to
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increase their influence in a highly competitive environment fueled by imperial
expansion. In a more magnified version of urban sprawl, the Ottomans struggled to
secure the integrity and unity of their more distant provinces into the Ottoman
Empire politically and nationally.
By the 19th century and after tumultuous periods of reform, the Ottoman
Empire’s frontier extended to North Africa, Mesopotamia, the Balkans, and parts
of the Arabian Peninsula. With European powers such as France, Russia, and
England encroaching on the Ottoman Empire, Abdulhamid II was faced with the
need to be careful with his alliances. Sultan Abdulhamid II’s willingness to
cooperate with the British soon fueled the disgruntled to speak out with anti-British
sentiment (Tallon, 2019). Eventually, the Young Turks (primarily the Committee
of Union and Progress) deposed Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1908 (Al-Hamdi, 2015).
This deposition left the Young Turks with the burden of further securing Ottoman
borders through various agreements and increased military presence around some
borders (Tallon, 2019). Not long after, however, an Ottoman–Balkan war
throughout 1912 and 1913 stripped the Ottoman Empire of its last remaining
territories in Europe (Tallon, 2019). Along with all of this tension, throughout the
late 19th and early 20th centuries in the Ottoman Arab provinces, particularly
aggressively in the “fertile crescent,” an opposition movement—Pan-Arabism—
had been brewing (Dawn, 1988).
The growing pan-Arab movement proved to be a tool for opposing imperial
powers to exploit, especially the British. With a second government stationed in
India, the British were highly involved in attempting to shift the balance of power
in the Arabian Peninsula to further secure their position in India and to deter other
European powers from establishing spheres of influence with the Arab peoples.
This led the British to utilize tactics with tribal leaders of both Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait that they had previously used in India, as well as to interfere with Baghdad’s
and Basra’s finely tuned political structure, leading to various consequences.
Although British intervention in supporting Arab movements during the 1880s and
throughout World War I assisted in achieving autonomy from the Ottomans, it
fueled bilateral and internal conflicts in the post-WWI period, eventually setting
the foundation for the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
The Ottomans under Sultan Abdulhamid II and after the Young Turk
Revolution, however, were privy to the European interest in the more distant
provinces such as those in present-day Iraq and the Gulf. Furthermore, the Ottoman
administration recognized vulnerability to European powers (Çetinsaya, 2003). For
instance, various governors, ambassadors, and viziers reported a British threat in
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Iraq and in the Gulf, with particular regard to Kuwait. The emboldened efforts of
the British to approach ambitious Arab leaders were attributed to a lack of a
“forward policy” and to local Ottoman officials being “neutral bystanders” to
Britain’s actions in the region throughout the 1880s (Çetinsaya, 2003, p. 199).
Further, ambassadors noticed the “neglect” of residents in Arab provinces
in what is now Iraq, as Ottoman officials considered those residents to be “ignorant
and uncivilized” (Çetinsaya, 2003, p. 201). Because of this “incivility,” Ottoman
administrators feared a conquest of Basra beginning with British control and use of
Kuwait’s harbors (Çetinsaya, 2003). Because of this and other factors such as
instability in the vilayets of Basra, Mosul, and Baghdad, in the years after the 1878
Berlin Treaty, the Ottomans sought ways to pull in the periphery more aggressively,
by planning for the Berlin–Baghdad railway, increasing naval presence, and
implementing policies on the ground in a rather unwelcomed process of
“Turkification”1 in an attempt to re-regularize administration empire-wide (Simon,
2004, p. 40).
The Arab Political Climate
Overtures by the British in Kuwait, Qatar, Yemen, and Bahrain were not
isolated events. As British authorities (more specifically, the government of India)
recognized a potential to exploit tensions in the region throughout the 19th century
and the interwar years, a “scramble for Arabia” was instigated (Tallon, 2019, p.
98). With the Ottoman Empire turning its attention to more direct rule in
Mesopotamia after the pacification of Mohamad Ali in 1841, discontent in local
communities began to brew (Blumi, 2012). As Arabs began to desire more
autonomy, the pan-Arab movement mobilized. Additionally, the increasingly
1

“Turkification” refers to the systematic process of limiting expression of variance in ethnicity,
language, and religion within Ottoman territories in order to enforce Ottoman uniformity. The
unionist ideology of the Young Turks paid little attention to diversity, as Ottomanism was largely
synonymous with being a Muslim Ottoman Turk. This ideology led to underrepresentation of
Arabs and other ethnic groups in the Ottoman Parliament. Because Arab identity was based
predominantly on religion and language, Arabs felt increasingly alienated by the Young Turk
administration imposing Turkish language policy, for instance. Further, Muslim Arabs associated
Turkification with the phasing out of Islam from society, particularly because of the irreligous
character of non-Arabic-speaking Ottoman government officials assigned to administrate their
areas. The disruption of traditional social and political norms in Arab territories eventually
encouraged Muslim Arabs to form literary organizations (e.g, al-Muntada al-Adabi) rejecting
Turkification, in an attempt to reinforce their version of group identity. Consequently, as Arabs
found their cultural, political, and social rights continually suppressed, an Arab Revolt ensued
(Kayali, 1997).
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aggressive racial Turkification policies of the Young Turks further urged and fueled
separationist, nationalist ideas in provinces such as Basra, eventually culminating
in the 1914 Great Arab Revolt (Simon, 2004). Pan-Arab sentiments occurred most
prominently in tangible form within Iraq and Syria (Dawn, 1988), where
publications of pan-Arab and nationalist thinkers were used in schools and were
circulated heavily. In comparison, the more tribal dynamics of the Arabian
Peninsula manifested these sentiments in expansionist strategies by various tribes,
such as Al Saud.
Writers such as al-Shurayqi, al-Khatib, and Miqdadi explored common
themes of the Arab nation being a “living body” (Dawn, 1988, p. 69) and of Arabs
as being the last of a series of Semitic migrations (i.e., Semitic wave theory),
making them “heirs of the Semites” (Dawn, 1988, p. 70).
With regard to external powers, pan-Arab/nationalist texts often contrasted
the “noble” Arabs to the exploitative, economically driven, “hateful” Persians and
“innately mean” Europeans (Dawn, 1988, p. 76). The texts also regarded the trade
routes going through Arab territories to India as a way for external powers to
weaken Arabs in the face of the Ottomans (Wagner, 2015). Despite this idea—
which later set the groundwork for the Ba’athist and Nasserist regimes—there was
an ideological dissonance with pan-Arabism, as Arabs were still willing to deal
with external powers to consolidate autonomy and greater agency from the
Ottomans (Dawn, 1988).
Furthermore, Arab movements also had a religious dimension represented
in Pan-Islamism: ideas of an Arab caliphate that would preserve Arab society from
the “second Jahiliyya” of Sufism (Dawn, 1988, p. 74), a religious sect highly
associated with Ottoman tradition. This was showcased with the increasing control
of Al Saud over Mecca and Medina through their use of the Wahhabis and Ikhwan
to consolidate influence in frontiers surrounding them, which threatened Ottoman
religious legitimacy and hajj revenues (Tallon, 2019). This later led to skirmishes
between Al Saud and the Ottoman-backed Ibn Rashid. Other figures began to
harness the Ottomans’ crumbling religious legitimacy as well, including Husayn
ibn Ali (sharif of Mecca), who called for a separate Arab Muslim state for himself
(Yaphe, 2004).
Later in the post-WWI period, however, the once-quelled conflicts among
movements in Arab territories gained even more traction; the pan-Islamists and
nationalists were in almost constant conflict. The British were quick to attempt to
take advantage of the tumult without properly understanding the complexities of

188

BUTLER JOURNAL OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH, VOLUME 7

the interconnections of these movements, leading to major instability in areas they
have occupied in what later became Iraq.
British Policy and the Arabs
Although the British did not fully comprehend political and social
intricacies in regions such as the vilayets of what later became Iraq, early endeavors
to explore the Gulf and surrounding areas navally in the 1700s and 1800s, mail
links, and the presence of political residents allowed for the British administration
to recognize the potential for a minimally challenged strategic encroachment into
the area (Simon, 2004). Serious consideration for mobilizing more direct control in
the Gulf by the British region began in 1913, however, when Ottoman neglect of
the area allowed piracy, arms sales, slavery, and German presence to go unchecked,
according to the British, threatening future British hegemony in the Gulf (Simon,
2004). Additionally, this was an opportune time to increase presence in Ottoman
territories in the Gulf, as the war-ravaged Ottoman Empire was focused elsewhere
after the yearlong Balkan conflict mentioned previously.
As World War I wore on, Britain surveyed the general situation of the
region and consequently also surveyed societal divisions that it might utilize
accordingly. According to a 1913 British governmental document, British policy
was multidimensional and included with regard to “Arabia” establishment of
protectorates in Southern Syria and Mesopotamia, a protectorate in Kuwait,
recognition of the Hijaz as independent, encouragement of an Arab caliphate led
by the sharif in Hijaz, and a coordinated military effort with other allied European
powers to quell unrest. Furthermore, the press would be used to politicize Sunni
Islam further throughout other areas in “Arabia” and even India. These plans would
also serve to put pressure against the unstable Young Turk administration from
within (Hurewtiz, 1914; Wagner, 2015). These policies aimed to achieve a concrete
severance of aspiring Arab leaders from the Ottoman sphere of influence while also
further divorcing religious credibility heralded by the Ottoman sultan as protector
of Mecca and Medina.
Furthermore, the British realized that to garner Arab support, their
propositions would have to be framed to appeal to existing movements (primarily
Pan-Islamism and Arab nationalism/Pan-Arabism, as previously mentioned). In a
1914 British governmental proclamation to “the natives of Arabia and the Arab
provinces,” Britain denied a desire to conquer, possess, occupy, or protect any Arab
territories (Burdett, 1998, p. 99). Further, the text heavily references God and refers
to the Ottomans as “Turks” who have “laid upon” the Arabs a “heavy burden” that
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the English would “cast” with “God’s help” (Burdett, 1998, p. 100). In another
proclamation a year later, the British maintained the same rhetoric, insisting on
complete independence and that “please God, [the lands of Arabia] return along the
paths of freedom to their ancient prosperity” (Burdett, 1998, p. 101), echoing the
sentiments of Pan-Arabists and Pan-Islamists as they appealed to them.
The British consequently increased their presence “on the ground” in the
Arabian Peninsula and in vilayets that later made up Iraq, attempting more “handson” policies. Britain took on an active role in resolving both tribal and political
conflict in the case of Kuwait, for instance. Additionally, the extravagance of the
buildings that housed British representatives became more prominent throughout
the 20th century, symbolizing the growing British influence in the area and the local
acceptance of their authority (Muir, 2008).
Real alarm in the Ottoman Empire was heightened, however, after what was
termed the British–Ottoman confrontation over Kuwait, spanning from 1896, with
Muhammad Al-Sabah’s assassination, to 1904. The Ottomans considered British
policy with the Arab provinces and areas such as Kuwait as another English
“civilizing” mission like that with Egypt in the past (Çetinsaya, 2003). Eventually,
the warnings and intuitions of the various Ottoman officials concerning the Arab
provinces and the Gulf were realized, as Kuwait began to pull away from the
Ottoman sphere of influence more definitively and ultimately succeeded in doing
so—meaning that Ottoman policies to control dissent were not enough.
Kuwait
Geographically, Kuwait (“Grane,” as termed by the British) was situated
south of the Ottoman province of Basra, strategically bordering Shatt al-Arab,
which made it a valuable land- and sea trade route for the Ottoman Empire and a
significant port between Basra and Bahrain, where Indian ships came to stop (Muir,
2008). Relatedly, Kuwait was a municipality in the Ottoman Basra province.
Kuwait’s location eventually made it a point of contention as imperial powers
competed to absorb it into their spheres of influence. Kuwait exploited its location
to create a commercial-friendly environment, even taking a toll on caravans that
passed through it to transport supplies and weaponry to the Ottoman provinces of
Damascus and Aleppo, eventually even rivaling Basra as a “trans-desert route”
(Muir, 2008, p. 171). The flow of weapons from and to the area was especially
problematic for the Ottomans and, later on, the British, as it gave rebel forces means
of battle and altered the status quo (Blumi, 2012). This exploitation of movement
was further optimized with Mubarak Al-Sabah’s increasingly strong ties with Al
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Saud and rivalry with Ibn Rashid (Blumi, 2012). Additionally, new trade routes
were established in the mid-1800s, excluding major merchants in the area and
British correspondents in nearby Bushire, giving Kuwait further leverage as a
trading post (Blumi, 2012).
The importance of Kuwait’s location of course did not go unnoticed by
larger powers. As the Ottoman Empire sought to invigorate its suffering economy
and link its provinces to the Anatolian metropole, Kuwait became the proposed end
of the planned Berlin–Baghdad railway (Blumi, 2012). The proposed railway
would dually attract European powers to its locality by the late 1800s in an attempt
to secure a foothold and more favorable economic shares, as well as cause Kuwait
to seek integrity even more aggressively (Rush, 1991a).
Beginnings of Kuwaiti–British Relations
Before the factors and events that led to Kuwait distancing itself from
Ottoman control are presented, context regarding this Ottoman–Kuwaiti
relationship must be detailed. As mentioned above, Kuwait’s geographic location
provided a political environment that would later allow Kuwait to propel itself
further from sole Ottoman influence through strategic balancing of major powers
and local alliances. Historically, however, Kuwait had always enjoyed a degree of
autonomy compared to areas in Ottoman Mesopotamia. In an administrative report
by the local British agency in Kuwait, contextual political and historical
information were provided to the British metropole. The document detailed that the
sheikh was regarded a de facto ruler, but it documented a de jure governor by the
Porte in the region (Archive Editions, 2020). This distinction would later allow the
British to surpass higher powers in the Ottoman “chain of command” to deal with
the Kuwaiti sheikh directly in order to manipulate this Ottoman “communications
problem” when the right time came to sway Kuwait into their sphere of influence
(Kumar, 1962, p. 71).
Although the Kuwaiti sheikh Muhammad Al-Sabah embraced Ottoman
relations, he was eventually assassinated by his ambitious half-brother, Mubarak
Al-Sabah, in 1896. With Mubarak in power, realizations of Kuwait pulling away
from Ottoman influence began. During his reign, Mubarak ran various military
campaigns to extend his tribal reach further into the Arabian Peninsula (Archive
Editions, 2020). This is also because his coup did not go completely unchallenged,
as the late Muhammad Al-Sabah’s allies, such as Yousef Al-Ibrahim, attempted to
counter Mubarak’s expansion militarily for more than two decades (Blumi, 2012)
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As Mubarak sought to fortify himself with regard to tribal alliances and the
seeking of British help, Ottoman officials aimed to prevent the British from creating
a toehold in Kuwait and saw the necessity of Mubarak’s “ejection” (Çetinsaya,
2003, p. 201). Realizing that Kuwait was too autonomous for the Ottoman Empire’s
integrity, officials planned to incorporate Kuwait in a “reconstitution” of Basra into
a single kaza more effectively (Çetinsaya, 2003, p. 201). By 1899, Kuwait had
secretly struck a deal with the British to guarantee its protection from Ottoman
forces, effectively severing it from Basra (Rush, 1991a). Despite previous attempts
by Mubarak to secure an agreement with the British, the British finally considered
dealing with Kuwait as they realized the Russian and German interests in the land.
Furthermore, once Curzon had assumed position as viceroy of India in 1898,
he had insisted that Kuwait was instrumentally important to British interests with
regard to India, trade routes, and ports in the Gulf (Muir, 2008; Pillai & Kumar,
1962). This British interest in Kuwait is undoubtedly also linked to the fact that
Kuwait was to be the endpoint of the Berlin–Baghdad railway, which pushed
Britain to interfere with construction indirectly to increase its bargaining power
against Germany. In this way, the British would ensure greater trade benefits once
the Berlin–Baghdad railway was completed, especially that the tracks would lie
precariously close to English–Iranian oil fields (Kumar, 1962).
In 1903, with Curzon’s visit there, Kuwait became a de facto British
protectorate, especially as Curzon recognized the threat of Kuwait falling back into
Ottoman influence if Al Saud would be on the losing side of tribal spats with the
Ottoman-backed Ibn Rashid (Al-Hamdi, 2015). By 1904, the British government
tasked political resident Knox to monitor the Khor Abdallah as well as relations
between Al Saud and other tribes in the vicinity. Knox’s reports had the dual
purpose of protecting trade interests and maintaining the status quo that marked the
official British presence in Kuwait (Muir, 2008). Consequently, Mubarak exploited
the competition of foreign powers in gaining access to Kuwait to achieve his own
ends.
Despite the secret British deal and the rather autonomous dealings of the
Kuwaiti sheikh, however, Kuwait continued accepting Ottoman titles, providing
tax to the Ottoman metropole, receiving revenues from Ottoman-provisioned date
farms to the north, and even providing aid for the 1912–1913 Ottoman–Balkan War
(Rush, 1991a). This was to perhaps prevent open conflict, along with the added
benefit of securing continuous and significant revenues from the date farms in a
power-balancing act.
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In 1913, however, the Anglo–Ottoman convention was signed. The
convention delineated the rather previously ambiguous northern borders between
Basra and Kuwait, granted Kuwait the islands of Bubiyan and Warbah, and
declared Kuwait autonomous but under “Ottoman suzerainty” (Pillai & Kumar,
1962, p. 118). During World War I, Anglo–Ottoman correspondences continued to
detail Kuwait’s cession diplomatically. Ttrue recognition of the Kuwaiti state by
the British Empire eventually occurred in 1914, with the outbreak of WWI, when
Kuwait symbolically adopted a red flag with the Arabic word for its name (Rush,
1991b). Consequently, Britain achieved its goal in establishing a protectorate in
Kuwait, as mentioned previously.
British interests in Kuwait continuously morphed throughout the 20th
century as Kuwait went from being a key port and land post to a source of oil with
the establishment of the KOC (Muir, 2008), meaning that Kuwait would have
British support until its official independence. Kuwait’s nationalist endeavors to
maintain its autonomy and the integrity of its borders continued until formal
independence in 1961 in the face of Al Saud and Iraqi efforts, and even then,
tensions remained with Iraq, later culminating in the 1990 Iraqi invasion.
Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra
The discussion of imperial relations with Ottoman Basra and, later on, Iraq
better explicates the border disputes between Kuwait and its neighbor throughout
the 20th century.
Contrary to their rather clear-cut dealings with territories and tribes in the
Gulf, British representatives found frequent difficulties in establishing a presence
in the Basra province because of a far greater Ottoman grip represented by the
regional administration’s jurisdiction and normative societal structures that were
more complex compared to the very tribal relations in the Gulf (Clark, 2008).
Additionally, Ottoman Basra represented a more highly multifaceted society, with
deep variations in culture, religion, language, and local political affiliation (Simon,
2004).
The vilayets of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul came into Ottoman control
under the reign of Sultan Suleyman I in 1534 (Yaphe, 2004). As discussed earlier,
with regard to the importance of Kuwait’s geographic location, the vilayets were
also instrumental to the Ottoman Empire because they were hubs for trade routes.
Additionally, the vilayets were a separating frontier between the Ottomans and the
Persians, which made them particularly challenging to manage and maintain long

193

BUTLER JOURNAL OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH, VOLUME 7

before European powers showed interest. These tensions were a result of the
multireligious and multiethnic nature of the vilayets’ residents, who found
similarities with their Persian neighbors, especially in Baghdad (Simon, 2004). This
diversity led to frequent revolts by Shi’i sects, which the Persians used to their
advantage. Arab Lakhnids and Ghassanids, Kurds, and Eastern Christians also
represented factions in society that neighboring empires utilized to incite unrest,
particularly throughout the 18th century (Simon, 2004). Social and political
disturbance became a feature of the area throughout World War I and well into the
late 20th century, especially in areas such as Kerbala and Baghdad (Yaphe, 2004).
The British and Iraq
Prior to British occupation of Iraq in 1917 and the establishment of military
rule, the British had entered Ottoman Basra through the British Mesopotamian
Expeditionary Force in 1914 (Al-Hamdi, 2015; Simon, 2004). At the time, the
British had identified the desire of local Arab Ottoman associates to become
autonomous, albeit within the Ottoman system (Yaphe, 2004). Prior to World War
I, the British had accumulated intelligence to infer certain dynamics within the Iraqi
provinces among the various religious, nationalist, and ethnic movements. As the
British began to settle in the recently conquered Iraq, however, their perceptions
were found to be largely false; movements became more heterogenous and began
to clash more violently and frequently, as mentioned previously (Wagner, 2015).
Policies to “civilize” the Arabs in Iraq into an independent state after World
War I were deliberated rather haphazardly and chaotically by several British
governmental entities: the War Office, the Foreign Office, the Arab Bureau, and
the India Office (Yaphe, 2004). In the vein of their methods of Indian rule, the
British attempted to create cleavages in Iraqi society by giving tribal leaders
considerable agency with tax collection and dispute resolution based on tribal
customs and land ownership, for instance, which had been largely absent during
Ottoman rule. This favoring of tribal provincial rule was an attempt to counter the
increasing influence of city folk, who had overwhelmingly nationalist ideas
(Yaphe, 2004); however, because Britain was implementing a one-size-fits-all
strategy in Iraq, domestic stability soon evaporated and tribal sheikhs became
increasingly authoritarian and brutal, thwarting political development (Yaphe,
2004).
Unrest became especially pronounced after World War I, and Foreign
Office officials sensed nationalist sentiment growing at an “unstoppable
momentum” (Simon, 2004, p. 36). Not long after, the 1920 revolt began and was a
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unifying event, joining the multiple religious sects and residents of differing
socioeconomic status to combat hypertaxation, unemployment due to the
appointment of British officials in the British Civil Administration, and even calls
for an independent Arab Islamic state (Wagner, 2015).
After quelling the rebellion by force, the British government worked to
reconsolidate control by abolishing military rule and setting up a Western-inspired
constitution in 1921, promising representation, checked power, and democracy
(Wagner, 2015). Following this came British deliberations on whom to appoint,
these being easily manipulated, pliable leaders and officials. As a result, an
inexperienced Sunni religious official leader was chosen, as well as a Hashemite
Arab, King Faysal I, who had no particular affiliation with any faction of Iraqi
society at the time (Simon, 2004). The result was something termed an institutional
façade (Yaphe, 2004, p. 33), a method for more indirect British control of Iraq.
Now with an established government, treaties, such as the binding 1923
Treaty of Lausanne, detailed the formation of the country of Iraq in the joining of
the three vilayets of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul—with no mention of Kuwait
(Pillai & Kumar, 1962). Upon Iraqi independence in 1932, another frontiermanagement agreement was drawn, with Sir Percy Cox issuing a memorandum
with Prime Minister al-Askari, to detail Kuwaiti–Iraqi borders once more based on
the 1913 Anglo–Ottoman convention (Al-Hamdi, 2015), reiterating its legitimacy
despite its ratification being previously interrupted by World War I.
Once a very Western-influenced and maladjusted Iraqi government was in
place, certain dynamics began to play out both domestically and bilaterally, with
Kuwait, throughout the 20th century.
Kuwait and Iraq
As discussed previously, Pan-Arab/nationalist movements continued with
fervor even after the British had assigned an Iraqi constitutional government (AlHamdi, 2015). After Faysal I’s death following Iraqi independence, however, a very
staunchly nationalist Ghazi I was king and was highly maximalist in his diplomatic
stance. To disseminate his ideology broadly, Ghazi I ran a radio station; propaganda
was rampant in the press. Using his media channels, Ghazi I illustrated ideas such
as that Kuwait was an illegitimate state and was instead part of Iraq. To support this
view, he cited Ottoman-era relations despite border delineations spanning back to
1913 (Pillai & Kumar, 1962). By 1938, Ghazi I’s claims reached their height; a
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military attack was planned, but when he unexpectedly died, the plan was
abandoned (Muir, 2008).
The advocation of nationalist and pan-Arab sentiment endured with
politicians as well. Prime Minister al-Said, under Faysal II, promoted secular panArab sentiments and threatened to annex Kuwaiti islands when Kuwait refused to
join a Hashemite union (i.e., AHU) to contribute funds (Al-Hamdi, 2015).
Additionally, al-Said’s fervent desire for Kuwait to join a Hashemite union might
have been an implicit diplomatic gesture to imply that Kuwait belonged within Iraqi
borders.
As the monarchy was overthrown in 1958 and a republic was established
under Qasim, however, nationalistic policies and diplomacy increased in
aggressiveness and frequency, with Qasim refusing to acknowledge Kuwaiti
independence in 1961, publicly stating that Kuwait was “an integral part of Iraq”
(Clark, 2008, p. 9). At this time, Kuwait had already established its position in the
international arena—at times even with help from the Iraqi government to join
international organizations—and had considerable influence on the British market
economy (Muir, 2008). This implicit threat by Qasim led to Kuwait requesting
British assistance preemptively, as well as a UNSC meeting being held. Iraq took
this opportunity to harness growing anti-British sentiment among Arab nations, but
it received little support from fellow Arab nations in opposing Kuwait (Al-Hamdi,
2015). As Qasim’s successor, Arif of the Ba’athist regime, continued to push the
claim on Kuwait, Iraq suffered domestic political unrest and a significant loss of
diplomatic ties (Muir, 2008).
Claims to Kuwait were based on historical Ottoman links, despite the
technical autonomy of Kuwait during that time and despite conventions detailing
borders, as mentioned previously. This was in part because Kuwait could provide
Iraq closer access to the Gulf and, after the discovery of oil, to more than 15% of
the world’s oil reserves (Pillai & Kumar, 1962). Furthermore, Iraq had experienced
tensions and border disputes with its neighbor Iran spanning from the days of
Ottoman rule, eventually leading to an economically devastating war with Iran
under Saddam Hussein (Yaphe, 2004). The Iraq–Iran War brought an already
politically turbulent and economically feeble Iraq to its knees, instigating the 1990
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to reconstitute losses on the grounds of reclaiming the
“rogue” state of Kuwait back into Iraqi control (Simon, 2004).
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Power Balancing: Consequences and Effects
Ilai Saltzman’s 2011 book, Securitizing Balance of Power Theory: A
Polymorphic Reconceptualization, reimagines common theories and strategies of
power balancing in international relations—such as soft- and hard balancing, buckpassing, and bandwagoning—in a revised, multifaceted framework with security at
its core. Relatedly, Randall Schweller’s 2006 book, Unanswered Threats: Political
Constraints on the Balance of Power, explores the causes for underbalancing in
terms of both domestic and international threats by discussing elements such as
social/elite cohesion and regime vulnerability. In this section, the theories presented
in the two books will be used to discuss and tie in the factors that led to Britain
gaining influence in the Ottoman Gulf and contributing to Iraqi domestic unrest,
which encouraged border disputes and later, the 1990 Iraqi invasion.
The Ottomans
In the context of the Ottoman Empire in the mid- to late 1800s, Schweller’s
ideas of underbalancing are very much relevant, as mentioned earlier, with the
complaints of Ottoman officials regarding a lack of “forward” policies, along with
the Ottoman policy neglecting the British presence. What prompts a state to delay
reactive policy toward governmental threats or concerns? According to Schweller
(2006), incoherent policies result from factors such as a lack of elite consensus,
governmental regime vulnerability, and threats to social cohesion. Additionally, an
important fact to consider is that decisions by individual policy makers occur after
assessments of perceived threat rather than of what is, which could lead to mishaps
in deciding power-balancing policies (Saltzman, 2011). All of the previous factors
have been exhibited, with the rise of Pan-Arabism and other social divisions in
Ottoman provinces, the threat of European powers, and the tumultuous reforms in
Ottoman administration, all discussed previously, leading to what Schweller termed
policy paralysis, which is caused by a weakened government generally having less
policy capacity (2006, p. 57). Furthermore, a compromised sense of governmental
legitimacy as a result of fragmented social cohesion would limit a state’s options to
enforce hard-balancing policies for fear of antigovernmental action in response.
Relatedly, limited domestic social cohesion often means that outsider threats do not
have the usual effect of increasing cohesion but rather disband ingroups further, as
with Iran and Shi’i groups in Basra, for instance.
Jack Snyder, however, has also suggested that instability in a state’s regime
would bring about another reaction in policy making: overexpansion (as cited in
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Schweller, 2006). Overexpansion was what the Young Turks attempted after their
assumption of power in the years before World War I. It should be noted that
overexpansion could refer to both spatial expansion and expansion of executive
power. Synder identifies two elements to a government’s decision to implement
overexpansion (which must not be confused with overbalancing): a weak central
authority and several concentrated interest groups (as cited in Schweller, 2006). In
the Ottoman Empire under the Young Turks came the continual development of
pan-Arab sentiment, conflict among the Young Turks themselves, and conflict
between Ottoman liberals and the Young Turk administration (Hurewtiz, 1914),
which led to policies that Arabs viewed as increasingly antagonizing (e.g., tighter
military and naval presences, and Turkification policies), eventually encouraging
Arab leaders to seek soft-balancing policies with European powers (e.g., Kuwait’s
agreement with the British).
The British
Although the Ottomans in the 19th century and early 20th century did not
engage in overbalancing with regard to Arab provinces, the British in many ways
did so as they gained more control of the region through the early and mid-20th
century. Along with overbalancing both during and after World War I, the British
initially implemented various soft-balancing techniques to gain a larger presence in
the Gulf in their quest to establish protectorates in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, etc.
Although still a confrontational method of power balancing, soft balancing
often does not feature open conflict. Instead, soft balancing can include diplomatic
maneuvering, nonmilitaristic policies, and institutional binding, and hard balancing
may be only a plan B to avoid widening conflict within the current balance of power
(Saltzman, 2011). In this instance, one example is the British cooperating with the
administrations of Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Young Turks while dealing with
local leaders in the Arabian Peninsula to secure personal interests and undermine
the Ottoman Empire from within. A prime example, of course, is the previously
discussed British deal with Kuwait, in which Kuwait also played an expertly tuned
game of soft balancing with the Ottomans and rivaling European powers. Although
the British’s soft-balancing measures were sound in upholding British interests with
regard to the political climate in the Arabian Peninsula and the insufficient,
underbalanced Ottoman response, the British began to significantly misinterpret
and misperceive the status quo as time wore on. In decision-making, state officials
must judge the level of threat domestically and internationally, as well as determine
the “resource extraction potential” at their disposal (Saltzman, 2011, p. 33)—that
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is, how capable their state is politically, militarily, diplomatically, and
economically to undertake certain policies. On one hand, it can be assumed that by
1917, as the British moved into Ottoman Mesopotamia, British officials considered
their resource-extraction potential high. This perception was due to their successes
in the Gulf and their advantage in World War I. On the other hand, the threat of the
occupied society dissenting is also perceived as high because of British militaristic
rule and drastic policies aiming to dramatically assert British control in an effort to
occupy the power vacuum left by the Ottomans. Snyder regards overbalancing
policies as both very costly and very likely to take away privileges from various
factions in society (as cited in Schweller, 2006). That being said, the overbalancing
policies of the British in what later became Iraq repressed significant portions of
society and highly privileged a select few, fueling dissent and instability as the
public refused the new balance of power that the British were attempting to instill,
and the British left a maladjusted, volatile Iraqi political environment in their wake
as they retreated by 1932.
Conclusion
As demonstrated in the previous section, it is important to note the crucial
connection between domestic politics and external policies throughout the
discussions of Ottoman policy (or lack thereof), Kuwaiti alliances, and British
presence in the Gulf. That is to say, domestic shifts in power have all led to
definitive events connected to Kuwaiti independence and Kuwaiti–Iraqi border
conflicts: Muhammad Al-Sabah’s assassination, Curzon’s assumption of the
position as viceroy of India, Pan-Arabism’s gaining of support, and the Ottoman
Empire’s suffering through various unsuccessful reforms.
Building on the Ottoman Empire’s internal political tumult, it becomes clear
that the once finely tuned system to govern and administer provinces has become
ineffective. This ineffectiveness was exhibited by the numerous movements
dissenting from Ottoman cohesion, as well as the failure of Ottoman officials
overseeing these areas to appease the growing ethno-religious movements (e.g.,
Orthodox Christianity, Shi’i Islam, Pan-Arabism) or to recognize that they were a
threat that might need intervention by the Ottoman metropole, in the
aforementioned “communications problem” (Kumar, 1962).
As discussed above, these growing separationist sentiments were attractive
to European imperial powers aiming to gain further influence around the Ottoman
Empire’s borders and slowly chip away at its core. Meanwhile, leaders in areas
such as Kuwait took advantage of their territories’ political, geographic, and
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economic importance to achieve their desires of autonomy by balancing various
powers appropriately over time. Once imperial powers gained further access and
influence into the Gulf through agreements such as this with local leaders, however,
their policies were not as predictable, as seen with Iraq and the British.
Britain’s miscalculations in power balancing during World War I and
throughout the early 20th century in what was once Ottoman Mesopotamia
reiterated Ottoman convictions that British presence in the Arab provinces was akin
to a civilizing mission—the British disregarded the complexities of the occupied
community and assumed that all those from a general geographic location required
similar policies (which were mostly built on a more aggressive divide-and-rule
method once the British assumed power).
Legacies of imperialism include governmental infrastructures that the now
“free” people are left to grapple with to define their new national identity. In the
case of Iraq, this proved a detrimental move by the British, later inspiring major
upheavals domestically as well as bilaterally. Relatedly, as previously mentioned,
domestic conditions are a great determinant of political decisions, meaning that the
raging clash of movements within Iraq left leaders with limited options for
maintaining control and nationalistic identity. Further, outsider threats (whether
real or perceived) are one method of improving cohesion, further encouraging Iraqi
authorities to instigate conflict over border integrity throughout the 20th century,
with heightened claims in times of economic distress or war, culminating in the
1990 Iraqi invasion on Kuwait, a territory largely autonomous before its
independence and fully sovereign at the time of the attack. Power-balancing
shortcomings by both Ottoman officials and the British government with regard to
Arab territories hence contributed to major political changes in both Kuwait and
Iraq, with some being quite detrimental.
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